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Gidon Gottlieb
ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS
Ihe rush of notable events set into motion by the uprising
nearly two years ago of Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank
and Gaza is impressive. Two decades of near tranquility in
Israel's occupied territories were shattered. The intifadeh pro-
voked Jordan's King Hussein to relinquish his claims to the
West Bank, which his grandfather had annexed in 1951. It led
the Palestine Liberation Organization to declare Palestinian
independence, to renounce terrorism and to accept Israel's
right to exist, which in turn paved the way for the diplomatic
dialogue between the United States and the PLO. Finally, in
Israel, it led the Likud-Labor coalition to adopt an initiative
for elections in the occupied territories for transitional self-
rule to be followed by negotiations on their final status. Op-
ponents on all sides rallied in an effort to cripple Prime Minister
Yitzhak Shamir's initiative. These events, and more, were
crammed into a short period of time, creating a sense of
unparalleled passion and fluidity, of fears among some and
euphoria among others.
But has all this brought a settlement of the long festering
conflict any closer? In the absence of any indication that Israel
is prepared to withdraw from at least some of the disputed
territories, or that the Palestinians are willing to settle for
something less than an independent state, what is there to talk
about? Is there any realistic diplomacy that can sidestep the
questions aptly put by Henry Kissinger: What territories, if
any, will be given up by Israel? Who shall govern there? And
what security arrangements will prevail after Israel's with-
drawal? Can Israel be asked simultaneously to give up territo-
ries and permit the foundation of a PLO state?
There are no clear answers yet to any of these questions and
the present outlook is grim on the three main concerns: the
peace process itself, the issue of Palestinian representation and
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the nature of the permanent solution. Yet leading Israeli offi-
cials and Palestinian leaders have in fact started to draw ten-
tative and vague images of what a permanent solution might
look like. Though largely unnoticed, amid the rush of dramatic
incidents, these images are significant; they form a new psycho-
logical context for every step in the peace process.
Israelis and Palestinians alternate between a hard and a soft
rhetoric. The hard speech of rejection gets the most attention,
but the softer, insinuating subtext intimates the outlines of the
conceivable. The softer subtext suggests that Israel will be
ready to offer maximal self-rule and political rights for the
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, the formula called
"self-rule plus," and that the Palestinians will be prepared to
accept a "demilitarized state" linked to Jordan.
In seeking the contours of a conceivable solution, it is clear
that the simple measures of earlier days will no longer do. The
old arsenal of remedies used to end the Arab-Israeli wars is
inadequate: ordering armed forces to new lines, enlisting U.N.
observers, separating adversaries and so on. Fresh thinking
about relatively unfamiliar notions has to adjust to a conflict
that has an unmistakable communal dimension.
The principles involved in a conceivable solution are hardly
those conventionally associated with either the Likud or the
PLO. Yet they can be discerned and abstracted from both the
published and implicit views of "hardline" Israelis and of the
PLO leadership in Tunis. They come alive in the context of
broad themes on which the subtexts of Palestinians and Israelis
coincide to a significant extent. These are themes heard not
among dovish circles only-hence their significance.
II
The issue of Palestinian representation bedevils all efforts to
create an environment to launch and sustain negotiations.
Israel refuses to have any dealings with the PLO, for reasons
that run deep. The present Israeli government fears that
talking to the PLO goes a long way toward accepting the
legitimacy of Palestinian aspirations for a state that would
constitute a mortal danger for Israel. Moreover, many in
Jerusalem doubt that the PLO has the authority it claims to have
in the occupied territories despite the verbal support lavished
on it. Leading officials in Jerusalem are convinced that for
making peace there is only one Palestinian community that
matters, the inhabitants of the territories. Beyond Israel they
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have to face the terrorist factions subservient to Syria. The
PLO, as they see it, is disorganized and fragmented. For their
part, important Palestinian factions continue to oppose any
political accommodation with Israel. Some, like the Islamic
Hamas, militate for the obliteration of the Jewish state: "There
is no solution for the Palestine question except through Jihad
[Holy War]."
Some in Jerusalem still hope that the PLO will fade away
before negotiations on final status begin. They put faith in the
emergence of an authentic local leadership that, in spite of lip
service paid to the PLO, can be expected not to hand over
control of its destiny to the men in Tunis. They know the bitter
hostility of Syria's Hafez al-Assad toward Arafat. They are also
familiar with King Hussein's wariness of the PLO. They believe
that neither the PLO nor its leader is trusted or loved in other
Arab capitals despite the diplomatic backing it receives. They
believe further that the organization is largely a creature of
the smoke and mirror effects of international diplomacy, which,
with time and patience, will eventually become irrelevant. In
the meantime however, the PLO maintains its hold on the hearts
of Palestinian Arabs and continues to weave its involvement
deeper into the fabric of world diplomacy.
Moving the peace process along is a high-wire act. Washing-
ton faces contradictory pressures. Israel and the local Palestin-
ian leadership must move toward agreement on procedures for
elections if these are ever to be held. However, the local
leadership shows no signs of moving without the PLO's approval.
No progress is thus possible without the participation of Tunis,
and Arafat will not go along unless he is satisfied that the
process will carry him further along the road leading to a
Palestinian state. The United States must therefore cajole him
with gestures and assurances to obtain his agreement.
The steadfast refusal of Israel to have anything to do with
the organization, and the deep dismay that the U.S. dialogue
with the PLO has engendered in Jerusalem, do not alter the
reality of the need to secure the assent of Tunis to the Shamir
initiative if local leaders are to enter into a dialogue with Israel,
stand for elections and negotiate agreements for transitional
self-rule. A peculiar feature of the U.S.-managed peace efforts,
therefore, is to engage the PLO as a party to the process despite
Israel's refusal to deal with it. As a result the United States is
now pursuing a "duologue" in which it carries on two separate
dialogues without acting as an intermediary. In the dialogue
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with Jerusalem, the government of Israel refuses even to be
briefed on the U.S. dialogue in Tunis; Jerusalem does not
concede the relevance of the views of the PLO leaders to any
foreseeable political process. Nevertheless there are surprising
similarities of views between the leaders ofJerusalem and Tunis
that can best be seen by juxtaposing some of their public
positions.
III
Throughout the process, some concepts and phrases have
become symbols, code words and battle cries. The idea of a
"state" for the Palestinians, the notion of "withdrawal," the
concepts of "sovereignty" and "self-determination" and the
formula "land for peace" all belong to the family of verbal
expressions; buzz words that must be de-demonized and de-
mystified or simply sidestepped. Coalitions and alliances have
formed around these concepts, which impede the fluidity of
discourse on the future of the territories. But the considerable
symbolic potency of some of the more difficult concepts-such
as sovereignty-can be defused. This can be achieved by a
careful "deconstruction" into their discrete components.
The End of Israeli Rule Over Palestinian Arabs.
This is without question the key to any progress. Contrary
to common opinion, it is not a point of contention. All sides
agree that Israel should no longer rule over the more than 1.5
million inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. This principle
is the foundation of the Camp David accords and is equally
central to the Shamir initiative. It is contested by none of the
major parties in the Knesset. To this end, the Israel Defense
Forces will be withdrawn and the remaining Israeli forces will
be redeployed into specified localities. The military govern-
ment and its civilian administration will also be withdrawn.
This much is unexceptional and has already been agreed to
in the Camp David Framework Agreement, which promotes
the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of the
territories and the legitimate security concerns of the parties
involved. The accords contemplate that these Israeli withdraw-
als will take place before negotiations on the final status of the
territories begin. The accords thus provide for the withdrawal
of Israel's forces from the West Bank and Gaza except from
specified security locations and except to the extent that Israeli
forces participate with Jordanian forces in joint patrols and in
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the manning of control posts to assure the security of the
borders.
Palestinian-Jordanian and Israeli Links.
The notion of a confederal link between Jordan and Pales-
tinians on the West Bank is now generally accepted. Last
November in Algiers, the Palestine National Council (PNC)
confirmed "the privileged relationship between the two frater-
nal Jordanian and Palestinian peoples, and that the future
relationship between the two states of Jordan and Palestine will
be established on confederal bases."
The consensus on the need for a link between the two banks
of the Jordan does not tell us what kind of Palestinian polity
would emerge in the West Bank and Gaza. The PLO insists that
it be an "independent state," but what does this really mean?
The notion of state in international practice calls to mind
different images. The United States, Vanuatu, the Vatican,
Austria and Byelorussia are all states in international law. The
PLO and the Palestinians now under Israeli rule are determined
to get their "state." It is the aim and end-all of their movement.
They aspire to such a state as a symbol of their vindication and
honor, a state with a flag, delivering passports to its citizens,
with a government of its own replacing foreign rulers. It would
take its rightful place in the family of nations and affirm the
common identity of Palestinians, their common fate and their
aspirations. It would provide justice, compensation and solace
to the Palestinian refugees and restore their right of return to
their country. This is precisely the sort of state that the Israeli
government opposes.
One striking feature in the discourse of Israeli and Palestin-
ian leaders is their willingness, at a time of continuing strife, to
speak of institutions common to the two peoples. The institu-
tions discreetly alluded to are not limited to the economic
realm. They also encompass political and functional concerns
like water resources. In this matter, it is best to quote the
principals. Yasir Arafat was asked in one interview: "Everyone
talks about a Palestinian confederation with Jordan .... Would
you consider a confederation with Israel?" His answer was,
"Why not? Look at the EEC. The youth of Europe are living
peacefully together, not killing each other the way their fathers
did."' His willingness to endorse the idea of a confederation
'T. D. Allman, "On the Road With Arafat," Vanity Fair, February 1989, p. 180.
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with both Jordan and Israel, and of the Benelux model in trade
and economic matters, is particularly telling. "Benelux" and
"confederation" are rapidly turning into new code words
pointing to a future of active relations rather than to a cold
peace. This concept has even received the support of a Soviet
representative to a Cairo conference earlier this year who
urged Palestinians to think of new solutions: "One must speak
of confederation with Israel, not with Jordan only." 2
Prime Minister Shamir's chief of staff, Yosef Ben-Aharon,
has also spoken of "a future confederal arrangement based on
ties with an Arab party east of the Jordan River and west of
the river that could be acceptable after a transition period of
autonomy." He observed that "a construct that includes three
entities makes more sense than a confederation between two
states."' He was very specific: Palestinians would choose leaders
to represent them in a new confederal body with Israel and
Jordan. "They would represent the entire territory." The seat
of the new administration-like that of the Israeli govern-
ment-might be in Jerusalem where, together with the elected
Palestinians, there would be representatives of Jordan and
Israel.
The confederation, as Ben-Aharon suggested, would acquire
its constitutional authority not from Israel, Jordan or the
Palestinians, but from the agreement among all three, making
the newly formed body the sovereign entity in the territories:
"That's the higher umbrella which connects all three ele-
ments." 4 Ben-Aharon recognized that Israel would also be
required to cede some sovereignty to create the confederation.
He added that each of the three parties could have a veto over
major decisions, including the allocation of water resources
and the establishment of new Israeli settlements. The confed-
eration would have wide powers in economic legislation, licen-
sing, freedom of access and passports. On these matters, Prime
Minister Shamir himself is more guarded. He has said, how-
Translated from an article by Yosef Harif, Maariv, Jan. 27, 1989.
Translated from an article by Akiva Eldar, Haaretz, Jan. 6, 1989.
The views of Ben-Aharon were outlined in an interview with Janet and John Wallach,
The Washington Post, March 26, 1989, p. 1, as well as in Haaretz, Jan. 6, 1989, p. 1, and the
Jerusalem Post, June 15, 1989, p. 1. For an earlier and more elaborate study of two- and three-
way constructs, see the author's article on "The Future of Palestine/Eretz Israel," in Divided
Nations in a Divided World, eds. G. N. Henderson andJ. G. Stoessinger, New York: D. McKay
Co., 1974.
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ever, that he is open to discussions not only about autonomy
but about federation as well.
Distinctions must be made between a confederation of a
territorial nature, a confederation between states, and one
between peoples. Likud may not be opposed to a confederation
between the Palestinian people and Jordan, provided the issue
of sovereignty can be sidestepped. Likud has long sought to
solve the question of the rights and status of the Palestinian
Arabs before the status of the land. A separation of the two
issues-the political rights of a people and their territorial
claims-is fundamental to any approach that the nationalist
center is prepared to entertain. Flexible and innovative for-
mulas can be found in the framework of the confederal idea.
Complex political and juridical notions such as "state" and
"republic," with all their ideological significance, will have to
be adjusted to the specific, real and symbolic needs of Israel
and the Palestinians.
King Hussein long ago shared the vision of the unity of both
banks of the Jordan River. He wrote in his 1962 memoirs,
Uneasy Lies the Head, that "Palestine and Jordan were both (by
then) under British Mandate, but as my grandfather pointed
out... they were hardly separate countries. Transjordan being
to the east of the River Jordan, it formed in a sense, the interior
of Palestine." Yet Hussein decided on July 31, 1988, to disso-
ciate his kingdom from the West Bank, and Jordan has since
largely removed itself from the diplomatic process dealing with
the future of the territories.
It is by now plain to see that both Israel and the PLO wish
Jordan to play a key role in the permanent solution for the
occupied territories. Jordan will likely be drawn back into the
maelstrom of the Palestine problem. The King will be called
to play a central role in negotiations that could lead to the
establishment of a confederation with the Palestinians. The old
"Jordanian option," with Jordan returning to territories va-
cated by Israel, ended with the King's speech ofJuly 1988. But
Jordan ultimately remains an essential party to any permanent
solution.
The United States has for a long time advocated a link
between the two banks of the Jordan. President Ronald Rea-
gan, in his speech of September 1, 1982, spoke of "self-
government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in
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association with Jordan." This is the formula that Secretary of
State James Baker repeated in his speech of May 22, 1989.
Foreign and Trade Relations.
The Shamir concept of self-rule for the Palestinian Arabs
excludes the conduct of foreign relations. Jerusalem's opposi-
tion to a Palestinian state and the Palestinian Arabs' aspiration
to such a state will turn foreign relations prerogatives into a
central issue when a permanent solution is negotiated. The
conduct of foreign relations is rich in symbols. But in this
matter also, the arsenal of formulas and solutions provided by
the concept of confederation could come to the rescue.
Palestinian spokesmen maintain that the state they demand
will give Israel a bridge to the Arab world and pave the way
for the acceptance of Israel by the Arabs, something that not
even Egypt could do. In a benign relationship, a confederation
or a similar construct linking Palestinians with Jordan could be
guided by the twin principles of neutrality and demilitarization.
It could be given international standing separate from and in
addition to that enjoyed by Jordan in the international com-
munity, without in any way affecting or modifying Jordan's
own status.
On a formal juridical plane no obstacle exists to giving an
entity that forms a part of another sovereign state full mem-
bership in the community of nations. Thus, the United Nations
recognized from the start the membership of the Ukraine and
Byelorussia-a formal juridical precedent for some, an anom-
aly for others. It is a precedent nonetheless that unties the
notion of international standing from that of independent
statehood in a manner that could also be used creatively to
resolve other major conflicts around the world. These two
notions were also untied in Western Europe, where the Euro-
pean Community now engages in diplomatic relations side by
side with its member states.
The views now beginning to be heard in Jerusalem and
Tunis on future market arrangements are strikingly similar
(although Israel's positions have certainly not been addressed
with a Palestinian audience in Tunis in mind). Arafat's vision
for the economic future of the area is one of association and
cooperation, not of partition and separation. He envisages an
economic union in the region like the one that currently exists
among Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg and ex-
tending even further, "Jordan, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, the
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area. You think that peace [is] only a paper? Peace has some-
thing to be implemented, joint ventures, another Marshall
[Plan]." 5 On the other side, in Jerusalem, similar views are held
in Prime Minister Shamir's office: a currency arrangement
reflecting the affinity between the Israeli shekel and the Jor-
danian dinar. In such a construct the Arab side would be given
free port facilities in Israel; this has indeed been a long-standing
offer made to Jordan. Shimon Peres has also spoken in support
of a Benelux approach.
The United States and the European Community have the
means to reinforce the commonality of economic interests
between Israel and its Arab neighbors and to enhance benign
aspects of a Palestinian polity. The U.S.-Israeli Free Trade
Agreement could be extended to the whole of a nascent com-
mon market community while the EC would be requested to
enter into a generous agreement of association with it. Thus,
it will be incumbent on outside powers to give the area an
economic lift to stabilize its societies.
Ideology, State and Homeland.
All the governments of Israel, whether dominated by Labor
or Likud, have distinguished between the State of Israel and
the Land of Israel. Apart from Egypt, no Arab state has been
willing to recognize any boundaries for the Jewish state. The
boundaries of the Land of Israel are biblical and are broadly
synonymous with those confirmed by the League of Nations
for the old British Mandate area. They include all of Palestine
west of the Jordan River. Before 1967, the State of Israel was
demarcated by the 1949 armistice lines. The distinction be-
tween the State of Israel and the Land of Israel is thus based
on international and juridical considerations.
This distinction is suggestive of two important principles:
-state and homeland are separate concepts;
-the national rights of a people can be exercised in different
fashions in different parts of the homeland.
On the Arab side, the deeply felt claims to all of Palestine
(including all of Israel) also form a formidable ideological
obstacle. It deeply divides the PLO. The PLO had long rejected
coexistence with a Jewish state and anything that might smack
of a two-states solution. This position was discarded in the
resolutions adopted at the Algiers meeting of the PNC in 1988.
Interview by Mike Wallace, "Sixty Minutes," CBS News, Feb. 19, 1989.
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However, the PNC has yet formally to repeal its covenant that
calls for armed struggle to replace Israel by a secular, demo-
cratic state of Palestine. A few influential and hardline mem-
bers of the organization continue to support a phased strategy
that is intended ultimately to remove the state of Israel from
the map.
From a Palestinian nationalist perspective Jaffa, Haifa and
Nazareth are no less part of the Palestinian homeland than
Jenin, Nablus and Hebron. The Palestinian refugees of the
1948 war dream of their return to homes in areas west of the
armistice lines in those parts of Palestine that Arafat would
now concede to the Jewish state. The PLO's decision to assent
to a two-states solution for the first time implicitly accepts the
principle that for the Palestinians also, state and homeland can
be separate concepts. In this regard the opposing positions of
Israel and the PLO are now symmetrical.
The principles that an Israeli Jew is in his homeland any-
where in the Land of Israel beyond the limits of the State of
Israel, and that a Palestinian Arab is in his homeland anywhere
in Palestine west of the Jordan River, faithfully represent the
attachment of both peoples to their land. Agreement will be
necessary on the extent and nature of the rights that Israelis
and Palestinians will concede to each other in areas regarded
as part of the others' homeland. Clearly, neither Israelis nor
Palestinians will accept the settlement of large numbers of
Arabs in the case of Israel, or of Jews in the case of the
Palestinians, on the basis of a homeland theory or on any other
grounds.
States rather than homelands have rights and duties under
international law. The notion of homeland has no juridical
standing. However, it is entirely possible by treaty to give legal
expression and legal status to the concept of homeland as
distinct and separate from the concept of state. Such a juridical
construct can be designed to overlap with or arise side by side
with the concept of state while remaining distinct from it. A
people may thus perceive that it has rights in a homeland that
stretches across state boundaries.
The problem of the Jewish settlements and towns established
beyond the Green Line (demarcating the 1949 armistice fron-
tiers with Jordan and Egypt) could be approached under a
homeland formula. Israeli Jews beyond the state limits would
be citizens of Israel yet living in their homeland, the Land of
Israel. In the framework of a two- or three-party confederation,
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the presence of scattered Jewish communities among the Pal-
estinian Arabs should not be an anomaly.
Sovereignty.
Sovereignty is, in Prime Minister Shamir's words, "the most
difficult issue between nations in any national conflict." In-
grained habits of thought among statesmen raise it up again
and again. It remains a potent symbol. Yet for our purposes, it
is a redundant notion, one that serves no function in the
solution of this conflict, a notion that in truth is best side-
stepped. It should be possible to avoid altogether the debate
over sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza by distributing its
various attributes among the parties in such a way as to satisfy
their essential demands.
Sovereignty in a three-party confederation has already been
discussed in Jerusalem. Ben-Aharon would place the area under
the sovereignty of a tripartite confederation of Israel, Jordan
and the Palestinians. It would acquire its constitutional author-
ity not from Israel, Jordan or the Palestinians, but from the
agreement linking all three, making the newly formed body
the sovereign entity in the territories. One particular advantage
to this solution is that it could make it possible to dispense with
an agreement on sovereignty altogether or to settle for a purely
formal outcome that will pose no problem to the ideologues in
Israel who pledged there will be no Arab sovereignty in any
part of the country west of the River Jordan. A solution of this
character should also go a long way to satisfy some Palestinian
nationalists.
Self-Determination.
This is another issue shrouded in a cloud of dense emotions
and the confusion of evolving legal doctrines. Derived from
President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, it became asso-
ciated in U.N. practice with the process of decolonization. Self-
determination is a right that a people is supposed to exercise
when a territory emerges from colonial rule. It is a right that
all states attempt to circumscribe whenever they face the na-
tional claims of a minority for secession or autonomy. In the
context of the Palestine question it has become a euphemism
for the right to establish a state.
But the concept of self-determination was given quite an-
other meaning in the elaborate Evian Agreements of 1962 that
ended France's Algerian war. Those agreements provided that
the Algerian people would vote in a "self-determination con-
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sultation" whether to accept or to reject the accords that had
been negotiated between France and the FLN (National Liber-
ation Front). The accords established that the right of self-
determination can be exercised by a people when it votes in a
plebiscite on a negotiated agreement.
The Evian Agreements are particularly germane because the
struggle of the Algerian people is widely regarded in the Arab
world as the high-water mark of heroic opposition to foreign
rule. They cannot be faulted in Arab eyes. They can serve as
a highly valuable precedent in negotiations for a Palestinian
settlement.
In Israel, the phrase "self-determination" seems to be losing
some of its threatening overtones. Speaking from the Prime
Minister's office, Ben-Aharon commented that he was "not
afraid of the term 'self-determination for the Palestinians'....
The label 'self-determination' is semantic .... I can also say
that I would give the Palestinians self-determination. If our
scenario materializes, we can give them a great deal to satisfy
their political aspirations and this is a kind of euphemism for
self-determination." He was even more explicit when he said,
"If you say that there are ten components of self-determination,
the Palestinians can achieve nine of them. An anthem and a
flag will not be given to them by any Israeli government. ' 6
Boundaries and Other Functional Lines.
Israelis and Palestinians alike appear to accept the notion
that a multiplicity of lines, serving different functional pur-
poses, will separate Israel from its neighbor to the east. This in
a real sense is "new thinking." In the Camp David accords, for
example, Israel agreed to differentiate between its borders and
lines for the redeployment of its military forces. Israeli officials
have also made reference to Israel's security boundary on the
Jordan River that need not coincide with its political limits.
Israel has constantly distinguished between the limits of the
State of Israel and those of the Land of Israel. In a speech in
New York Prime Minister Shamir said early in 1989 that he
hoped for "the kind of cooperation and understanding with
our Arab neighbors which will make borders irrelevant, . ..
just as they are becoming irrelevant in Europe." On the Pal-
estinian side, Arafat's support for the principle of a common
6 Menachem Shalev, "Not Afraid of Palestinian Self-Determination," Jerusalem Post, June
15, 1989, p. 1.
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market with Israel implicitly distinguishes between political
borders and functional borders of an economic character. Like
Shamir, he supports an approach inspired by European solu-
tions to age-old conflicts.
These positions are of profound significance, for they point
to a readiness by both Israeli and Palestinian leaders-always
bearing in mind that Arafat is not in Israel's view a partner for
peace-to blend aspects of two approaches to an eventual
solution of the conflict. These can be characterized as, first,
the separation approach that would reestablish the physical
barrier between Israel and its Palestinian and Arab neighbors
that prevailed between 1948 and 1967 and, second, the coop-
erative or functional approach that would look for pragmatic
solutions to different categories of problems: security, water,
trade, finance, holy places, refugees and so on. A combination
of selected features of the two approaches, "association
through separation," would yield a variety of boundary and
demarcation lines that are increasingly common in the practice
of states. This approach does not imply that either Israel or its
Palestinian neighbor would agree to an influx of unwanted
workers, immigrants or settlers beyond those they might spe-
cifically agree upon.
Security Arrangements.
The issue that will make or break any agreement is the issue
of security. Without security arrangements that satisfy Israel,
there will be no agreement. The facts are well known though
they can be obscured by a comparison of Israeli armed strength
with that of the PLO. Israel in its struggle for survival had to
face military dangers far greater than those posed by the
Palestinians. Since 1948 Israel has been at war with Egypt,
Syria, Iraq, Jordan and even Lebanon; Egypt alone has made
peace with Israel, and a cold peace at that. Hence Israel views
its security problem in terms of the Arab world as a whole.
Israel has a diminutive territory with no strategic depth. The
whole state would fit comfortably in a typical American county.
From what is essentially a beachhead on the Asian mainland,
Israel faces on its eastern front formidable Arab forces greater
than those of NATO in Europe. Syria and Iraq alone can muster
an armada of 10,000 tanks. The quantitative gap between
Israel and these forces continues to widen. The Arab armies
are being equipped with accurate ballistic missiles. Egypt, Syria
and Iraq have a proven gas warfare capability.
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None of the Arab regimes is democratic and they have all
experienced coups, assassinations or uprisings to which they
remain vulnerable. In Egypt and many other Arab states,
political stability is threatened. Islamic fundamentalist move-
ments dedicated to the destruction of Israel aspire to seize
power. Domestically, Israel's security problems are com-
pounded by its Arab minority, which consistently votes for
parties hostile to the Zionist ideals and increasingly expresses
solidarity with the intifadeh. Internationally, Israel's isolation
has become proverbial and its only remaining ally, the United
States, has begun to retrench in Europe as America enters an
era beyond containment with limited capability to project
power in the Middle East. All the while, the Soviet Union
continues massive arms sales to its Syrian ally, extends the
strike range of the Libyan air force and is close to a major arms
deal with Iran.
Taken cumulatively, Israel's security problems appear daunt-
ing despite the proven valor of its armed forces. Its military
strength is to no avail in the struggle with Palestinians in the
territories. Nor would it be effective in countering the spread
of the intifadeh into Israel proper that many observers now
expect.
On the Arab side, Palestinians, Lebanese, Syrians and Egyp-
tians have all experienced firsthand the force of Israeli arms at
one time or another during the past 25 years. The perception
in the Arab world that Israel presents a threat is thus easily
understood, especially since Israel is credited with its own
powerful nuclear arsenal. From an Arab perspective, the fact
that Israel has been struggling for survival in an Arab world
that calls for Israel's extinction is beside the point; what counts
is that it is Arabs who have found themselves under Israeli rule
and not the other way around. Hence the Arab side too will
seek some security assurances, although its leaders know that
the root of the conflict in the area lies in the hostility of the
Arab world to the Jewish state. It is this very hostility that has
built Israel into a major military actor.
Territory is a major component of Israeli security. It is
needed for warning time to mobilize the civilian army and to
carry the battle away from the vulnerable heartland. The Israel
Defense Forces require early warning stations on the ridges
above the Jordan River that are only 12 hours' driving time
away for Iraq's huge mobile tank forces. It also enables Israel
to monitor a security fence along the border with Jordan to
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prevent the infiltration of terrorists, to keep the vital city
centers of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv beyond small arms and
mortar range, and to keep its highways safe for travel. Military
considerations such as these dictated the territorial plan of
Yigal Allon two decades back that remains the basis for the
Labor Party's peace proposals. When it was in power, Labor
strenuously resisted efforts to have Israel withdraw to the
armistice lines of June 1967, which Abba Eban once described
as the "lines of Auschwitz" for the deadly danger they posed
to the survival of Israel.
The lines demarcated for different military purposes need
not coincide; patrols along the Jordan River, early warning
stations, areas for the redeployment of forces, demilitarized
zones and special strategic areas could all be considered if one
is to take seriously Arafat's statement that "a peace settlement
will contain every conceivable condition necessary to guarantee
Israel's security." The security regime for areas from which
the Israeli army will have withdrawn or from which it will be
redeployed will undoubtedly be one of the thorny issues in
negotiations.
Refugees, Right of Return and Citizenship.
Fatah's second in command, Abu Iyyad, wrote in 1981 about
the Palestinians' need for "a flag and a passport." This is a
recurrent theme in the Palestinian rhetoric. It expresses their
craving for dignity, identity and roots. It also addresses the
problem of the Palestinian refugees, many of whom are state-
less or travel on refugee documents. The symbolism of a flag
and a passport is not to be dismissed lightly. A passport usually
signifies the right of the holder to travel back to his country;
the issue, therefore, is closely linked to one of the thorniest
questions, the right of return.
A dual system of passports for Palestine "nationals" and for
"citizens" of the confederation could help address the problem
of the refugees. This could be done in terms that would
differentiate the rights of refugees from those of the inhabit-
ants of the territories. A national passport would express for
every holder the emotional and symbolic bond that unites the
Palestinian people. The rights of "nationals" in a future con-
federation would have to be defined with care. Inhabitants of
the territories would be entitled to a passport of "citizen" of
the confederation in addition to the national papers.
The right of return is one of the great symbolic issues of the
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conflict. The declaration of Palestinian independence implicitly
distinguishes between two parts of Palestine: the state of Pal-
estine and the state of Israel. Before the declaration, the right
of return applied, in the Palestinian view, to the whole of
Palestine. The declaration has altered the position of the PLO,
which now accepts coexistence with the Jewish state. The PLO
has not yet clarified its position on the right of return to the
areas that it is now willing to concede to Israel for the first
time. The new PLO position does, however, suggest that the
right of return does not have the same meaning as it applies to
Israel and as it applies to the state of Palestine. In Arafat's
words, the state of Palestine is the state of "all" Palestinians,
presumably also the state of the Palestinian refugees. Does the
PLO affirm the right of return of Palestinians to a Palestinian
state or also to Israel? Will it be satisfied with compensation for
those who choose not to return to the Palestinian state?
The inexcusable plight in which so many refugees are still
trapped requires that compensation be not only full and prompt
but that it be generous as well. The international community
will be called upon to help. But no Israeli government can
agree to the actual physical return to Israel of the descendants
of the refugees of the 1948 war. Such a return, it is widely
believed, would spell the end of Israel as a Jewish state. The
PLO would not necessarily insist upon it, provided the Palestin-
ian refugees of the 1967 war are granted the right of return
to the West Bank and Gaza. The principle of compensation for
all Palestinians who choose not to return is not contested by
anyone.
Jerusalem.
It is perhaps wise at this stage not to explore too deeply the
most emotionally loaded problem of all: the future of Jerusa-
lem. The tantalizing comments on the future of the Holy City
by Prime Minister Shamir's close aide suggest the barest frame-
work of an approach. Jerusalem would remain an undivided
city. The municipal limits could well be enlarged. This would
make room for the institutions contemplated for the confed-
eration, which would have its seat in Jerusalem together with
its Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian representatives. Jerusalem
would remain, of course, the capital of Israel, and since it could
also be the capital of the joint confederation it would thus
become a true "capitals district." On this problem as well, a
confederation formula may ease the way.
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IV
The difficulties of turning the "soft" subtext into reality are
truly awesome. In Tunis, Arafat appears to be the main unify-
ing force behind the new two-states policy. It is not clear who
could replace him were he to leave the scene. In Israel, perhaps
only a leader from the right is in a position to make the difficult
decisions, as was true when President Nixon managed a suc-
cessful opening to China. It was, after all, Menachem Begin
who concluded peace with Egypt. It may take a Shamir to
reach a historic compromise with the Palestinians.
The salient features of such a compromise are beginning to
stand out from the analysis above. In a conceivable solution:
-Israel will not rule over the Palestinian Arabs in the West
Bank and Gaza;
-Israel will withdraw its military administration and rede-
ploy its forces in specified security locations;
-there will be elaborate security arrangements involving
demilitarization and other measures;
-several kinds of boundary and other lines will be drawn
for different purposes.
-The solution is likely to involve a two- or three-way
construct or confederation among the Palestinians, Jordan
and Israel.
-The political rights of the Palestinian people and the
formal status of the lands between Israel and the Jordan
River can be disentangled from one another and dealt
with at different times.
-The two concepts of statehood and homeland will also
have to be disentangled and adapted to the specific ideo-
logical requirements of Israelis and Palestinians alike;
some national rights-including the presence of some
settlements-will have to be confirmed in those parts of
the homeland that lie beyond state limits.
-"Sovereignty" and other divisive notions and code words
may have to be deconstructed or sidestepped altogether.
-"Association through separation": The permanent status
of the West Bank and Gaza will combine aspects of a
separation as well as aspects of a solution based on associ-
ation. The separation features will protect the national
character of the Jewish and Arab polities; association will
allow practical problems such as trade and water resources
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to be addressed within the two- or three-way construct
linking Palestinians with Jordan and Israel.
A settlement along the lines gingerly hinted at in Tunis and
Jerusalem would have evident weaknesses. It would be complex
and ambiguous. It could fail to fully satisfy the ardent constit-
uencies on either side that clamor for a clearcut outcome. It
would bypass the problems of sovereignty, of statehood and of
boundaries in terms that are familiar to the embattled nations.
It would create closer economic and trade links between Israelis
and Palestinians than many consider desirable. It would disap-
point many and antagonize those who refuse to compromise
historical rights and just claims. It could be vulnerable to a
demographic tide more threatening to Israel in time of peace
than in wartime. It would be exposed to religious passions.
Yet, for all the impediments and for all the ominous threats
to the diplomatic efforts, the significant and consistent, gentler
subtext of the rhetoric begins to show the way to a viable
Israeli-Palestinian coexistence.
